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IN THE SUPREME COURT 




V. PERSHING NELSON, 
RALPH L. SMITH and 
GLADYS SMITH, d/b/a 
GLADYS' BEAUTY SALON, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT NELSON 
NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action to recover for personal injuries sus-
tained when plaintiff fell down a flight of stairs on prem-
ises owned by the defendant Nelson and leased in part to 
the defendants Smith. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
At the conclusion of all of the evidence, the trial 
court granted the respective motions of both defendants 
for directed verdicts in their behalf. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant Nelson seeks affirmance of the judgment 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant Nelson, a practicing attorney in Provo, 
Utah, was the owner of a building located at the corner 
of University Avenue and 200 North in Provo, Utah. On 
the date of the accident in question, June 25, 1971, the 
defendants Smith d / b / a Gladys' Beauty Salon, occupied 
the southwest corner of the ground floor of the building 
in question and also used for storage a portion of the 
basement area. Another tenant also had a right to use 
the basement storage area. 
At the Southeast corner of the building there is a 
garage for employee parking (Ex. 1). In the southwest 
portion of the garage there is a large metal-covered ser-
vice door which allows entrance into the rear of the 
building (Ex. 2). This door opens inward to a landing 
area which is approximately 10 feet by 5 feet in diameter 
(Ex. 4). There is a stairway on the west side of the land-
ing to the basement area, and a rear door to Gladys' 
Beauty Salon operated by the defendants Smith is situated 
at the southwest corner of the landing area and opens 
inward into the salon (Ex. 3). Illumination of the landing 
area is provided by a light bulb hanging directly over the 
landing area. The light is activated by a switch on the 
east side of the door which leads into Gladys' Beauty 
Salon. The door leading into Gladys' has a sign on it 
which reads "EMPLOYEES ONLY" (T. 91 , Exs. 3 & 25). 
During the time the Smiths occupied the premises, 
Mr. Smith maintained the rear entrance area (T. 93). 
Defendant Nelson had specifically instructed the Smiths 
that the latters' patrons were not to use the rear door 
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(T. 94). Mr. Nelson checked the premises regularly twice 
a day when he was in town, and if he ever saw the outside 
rear door open, he would close and lock it (T. 99). Mr. 
Nelson never had seen anyone use the outside rear door 
other than employees of the two tenants, Gladys' and 
Spice Rack, and service personnel (T. 100-101). 
The Smiths gave general instructions to their employees 
that shop patrons were not to use the rear door, and if 
they saw a patron use the rear door, they specifically in-
structed them not to do so. The rear door was regularly 
used only by employees of the shop, suppliers, delivery-
men and paid models (T. 358). Mr. Smith understood that 
it was Mr. Nelson's instructions that the outside rear door 
was to be kept closed and locked at all times (T. 367). 
While there may have been isolated occasions on 
which Mr. or Mrs. Smith saw a patron use the rear door, 
there is no evidence in the record that Mr. Nelson ever 
saw or was aware of the fact that patrons may have 
occasionally used the rear door. 
The outside rear door, which weighs 140 lbs. (T. 
375), was hung in such a fashion that when opened, even 
slightly, and released, it would continue to swing to a 
full open position (T. 376-377 & Ex. 29). Because of its 
weight and the off-plumb manner in which it is hung, it 
has swung open enough times with enough force to mark 
the south, inside wall of the landing area (T. 376). 
On the date of the accident, the plaintiff had an ap-
pointment at 2:00 p.m. at Gladys' Beauty Salon to have 
her hair set. She parked near the front entrance and en-
3 
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tered through the front door (T. 245-6). She left the 
salon for a short period of time to pick up her husband 
with her car, apparently exiting through the front door 
(T.246). 
When Mrs. Black returned to the salon, she could 
not find a parking space on University Avenue and so 
she drove around the block and parked on First East 
Street (T. 247). Since she did not want anyone to see 
her with her hair in rollers, she decided to attempt to 
enter the salon through the rear door. She had not en-
tered the salon before by that route (T. 247), although 
she had exited through the rear door on one prior occasion 
during the previous winter (T. 248). 
When Mrs. Black opened the door, it was light in the 
landing area (T. 301). After she entered and "subcon-
sciously batted" the door shut, it was dark (T. 249). She 
thought she was as close to the beauty shop door as the 
outer door, and so attempted to walk toward the beauty 
shop door. She apparently did not see or notice the stairs 
when she opened the outer door and walked into the land-
ing area. She saw the rear door of the beauty salon (T. 
250), but did not see the "EMPLOYEES ONLY" sign on 
the door (T. 316), nor the stairs which were within a 
foot or two of the door (T. 316, Ex. 3). 
4 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFFS CONDUCT CONSTITUTED 
NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW 
There is no question from the rceord but that plain-
tiff knew that patrons of Gladys' Beauty Salon were ex-
pected to enter the salon by way of the front door, which 
was an acknowledged safe entrance (T. 311). Also, there 
is no question from the record that plaintiff was more 
concerned with the problem of getting back into the 
beauty shop and not being seen with curlers in her hair 
(T. 247) than she was in making reasonable observations 
for her own safety as she attempted to enter into the 
beauty salon through its rear entrance. She was appar-
ently in such a hurry that she did not remember the man-
ner in which she closed the outside door after entering 
into the landing area (T. 305-307), whether or not the 
light in the landing area was "on" or "off" before closing 
the door (T. 251), nor did she see that there was an "EM-
PLOYEES ONLY" sign on the door she intended entering 
(T. 316), and she did not see the stairs adjacent to the 
door she intended to enter (Ex. 3). 
Plaintiff seems to contend that she was confronted 
with a sudden emergency situation when she found her-
self in the unlighted landing area, after having closed 
the door, which could not have closed by itself (T. 376-
377 & Ex. 29). But one cannot avoid the legal requirement 
of exercising due care for one's own safety by invoking the 
"sudden emergency" doctrine, if one participates in or con-
5 
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tributes to the situation that caused the sudden emergency. 
As stated in Zook vs. Bair, 514 P.2d 923, (Wash. 1973): 
" . . . suddent emergency is appropriate when the 
emergency is not brought about, in whole or in 
part, by the negligence of the party seeking to in-
voke the doctrine. Tobias v. Rainwater, 71 Wash. 
2d 845, 431 P.2d 156 (1967); Lee vs. Gotten Bros. 
Co., 1 Wash. App. 202, 460 P.2d 694 (1969); W. 
Prosser, Torts, Section 33 (3d ed. 1964)." 
Factually, plaintiff is on the horns of a dilemma. If, 
as she claims, the landing area was illuminated to the de-
gree that she was unaware that the inside light was not 
"on" when she opened the exterior door (T. 301), then 
the area was illuminaetd sufficiently for her to see the 
stairs which constituted the entire west side of the landing 
area and was within a few inches of the door she intended 
to enter (Ex. 3), and she was negligently inattentive in not 
seeing what was there to be seen. 
On the other hand, if when plaintiff opened the ex-
terior door she could not readily see the stairs adjacent 
to the rear door of the beauty salon, then she should not 
have entered the area or closed the outside door before 
determining if there was a light to turn on and where the 
switch was located. 
Regarding the obligation of seeing what is there to 
be seen, this court has long required such as an obligation 
of exercising due care for one's own safety. In Nuttall vs. 
Denver & Rio Grande Railway Company, 98 Utah 383, 
99 P.2d 15 (1940), which involved the driver of an auto-
mobile which failed to see a train, the court said: 
6 
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"In this case after giving appellants the benefit of 
the most favorable construction of the testimony 
of their own witnesses the conclusion must be 
reached that the deceased could have seen the train 
in ample time to have stopped had he looked and 
if he did look upon seeing the near approaching 
light it became his duty to bring his automobile 
to a stop. His failure to look or to act upon what 
he saw if he did look bars a recovery here as a 
matter of law. . /' (Emphasis added.) 
This obligation was reaffirmed in Benson vs. Denver 
and Rio Grande Railway Company, 4 Utah 2d 38, 286 
P.2d 790 (1955), wherein the court stated: 
". . . Since plaintiff testified that if he had seen 
the train when within 20 feet of it he could have 
stopped it compels the conclusion that he either 
did not look or if he looked he did not heed what 
he saw as was said by this court in the Nuttall case, 
supra: 
\ . . he could not, from the undisputed 
facts appearing in the record, have used 
that degree of ordinary care required of 
him for his own safety/ " (Emphasis added.) 
and in Abdulkadir vs. Western Pacific Railroad Company, 
7 Utah 2d 53, 318 P.2d 339 (1957), the court observed: 
". . . Where the physical facts and circumstances 
are such that he could, by looking or listening, 
have seen or heard the approach of the train, he 
cannot be heard to say, that he looked and listened, 
yet did not see or hear it. Under such circumstances 
it is but natural to presume that the traveler either 
did not look and listen, or that he failed to heed 
what he perceived, and such conduct will generally 
impute contributory negligence as a matter of law/9 
(Emphasis added.) 
7 
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Also, in Richards vs. Anderson, 9 Utah 2d 17, 337 P.2d 
59 (1959), summary judgment for the defendant was af-
firmed by this Court which noted that: 
"It is a well settled rule that one may not be 
heard to say that he did not see what was plain to 
be seen. He either failed to look, or saw and failed 
to heed, either of which makes him negligent/ ' 
In case somewhat similar to the facts of the instant 
case, Whitman vs. W. T. Grant Company, 16 Utah 2d 81, 
395 P.2d 918 (1964), the Court affirmed a summary judg-
ment against Whitman who had delivered merchandise 
to a department store and in returning to his truck, went 
through the first door he saw, opened it, turned to close 
the door behind him and stepped off into an elevator 
shaft. In its opinion the Court said: 
"He appears to have violated a sound and often 
echoed dictum which arises out of experience and 
common sense to 'watch where you are going/ 
when no excuse was shown for his failure to do so." 
With respect to the situation of walking into an area 
which, because of darkness, one cannot see substantial 
objects, if that be the fact situation, it is well established 
in this jurisdiction that such conduct constitutes negligence 
as a matter of law. In Tempest vs. Richardson, 5 Utah 
2d 174, 299 P.2d 124 (1956), plaintiff, as a social guest 
attempting to find the bathroom in defendant's home, 
mistakenly opened a door leading into the basement and 
fell down an unlighted stairway. The trial court granted 
defendant's motion for summary judgment and the plain-
tiff appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed in the fol-
lowing language: 
8 
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"Had appellant exercised ordinary and reasonable 
care for her own safety, she would not have opened 
a door and stepped into a dark and unlighted area 
with which she was unacquainted without first 
ascertaining what was beyond the door even 
though she had not been told that the room to 
which was going was lighted." 
Also, in Wood vs. Wood, 8 Utah 2d 278, 333 P.2d 
630 (1959), the plaintiff sued to recover for injuries she 
sustained in falling into an unrailed and unlighted stair-
well in the garage portion of defendant's home. Plaintiff 
had seen the stairway approximately ten months prior to 
the accident, but temporarily forgot about it at the time 
of the accident. The trial court entered judgment for de-
fendant and plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court af-
firmed on the basis that the facts showed the plaintiff was 
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. In 
this regard the Court stated: 
"We have discussed the contentions as to defend-
ant's primary negligence merely to indicate our 
doubts as to its existence. But it is unnecessary to 
resolve the issue as to whether a jury question 
existed in that regard because of the view we take 
of contributory negligence. It supports the trial 
court's direction of a verdict against the plaintiff, 
as will presently appear. 
Plaintiff says that although she had prior 
knowledge of the stairwell she could not be 
charged with negligence as a matter of law for 
walking into the open stairwell because in the 
darkness it was a hidden danger in the area where 
she might reasonably be expected to enter the 
house because of the implied invitation; and justi-
fies her failure to be aware of it by the fact that 
her mind was preoccupied by the wedding plans 
9 
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and that it had been ten months since she had seen 
it. In that regard she is confronted with a dilemma: 
she either had in mind the existence of the stairwell 
or she did not. If she did, she was obliged to guard 
against the known hazard; if she did not she is 
met with the principal recently affirmed by this 
court in the case of Tempest vs. Richardson that a 
guest could not enter heedlessly into the darkness 
into an unknown area and then complain of dam-
ages there encountered." 
And in Henry vs. Washiki Club, Inc., 11 Utah 2d 
138, 355 P.2d 973 (I960), the plaintiff sued to recover 
for injuries sustained when he fell down a darkened stair-
well while looking for a rest room in the back of defend-
ant's tavern. The trial court granted summary judgment 
in favor of the defendant which was affirmed by the Su-
preme Court. The Supreme Court cited the negligent con-
duct of the plaintiff in the following particulars: 
"Instead of inquiring, or observing at the north 
end of the tavern where the rest rooms were, he 
went to the south end of the tavern proper, 
through some swinging doors into a room which 
he said was so dark he could hardly see at all, and 
groped his way along for about 25 feet, through 
another, and fell down a stairway." 
It is difficult to determine from plaintiff's testimony 
whether she contends that the landing area was completely 
dark, or whether she could see light under the rear door 
of Gladys' as she attempted to walk toward it. As quoted 
by plaintiff at page 10 of her brief, it appears from her 
direct testimony (T. 249, Lines 13-23) that she could see 
some light from under Gladys' rear door and attempted to 
walk toward it: 
10 
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"QUESTION: What did you do when you found 
yourself in the dark? 
ANSWER: Well, by this time I was quite posi-
tive that I was just as close to one door as 
I was to the other, because when I opened 
the door I could see the passageway to the 
Beauty Shop door, and I thought I was going 
in that direction in the dark. 
And rather than turn around I just didn't think to 
turn around and go back to the door that had 
closed on me. I didn't know where it was as 
much as I knew where the lighted door was. 
And I was going in that direction." 
However, on cross-examination, plaintiff stated that she 
could see no light under Gladys' rear door and that it was 
pitch black when the outer door closed (T. 308, lines 10-
23): 
"QUESTION: Now, the doorway where Gladys' 
Beauty Salon, if there is a light on in the area 
that is past the door, have you had enough 
experience in this area to know whether or not 
you could see light underneath the door? 
ANSWER: No. 
QUESTION: Did you see any light whatsoever 
underneath the door on the occasion that you 
fell? 
ANSWER: No. It was pitch-black. 
QUESTION: And so there was no light whatso-
ever in the area? 
ANSWER: That's right. 
QUESTION: It was absolutely pitch-black when 
you were walking? 
ANSWER: Yes." 
11 
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Under the rule laid down in Alvarado vs. Tucker, 2 
Utah 2d 16, 268 P.2d 986 (1954), that a witness' testi-
mony is no stronger than as left on cross-examination, the 
latter version of the plaintiff's conduct must be accepted 
for the purposes of this appeal. 
POINT II 
THE DEFENDANT NELSON DID N O T VIO-
LATE ANY DUTY OWED TO PLAINTIFF. 
There is nothing in the record to even suggest that 
plaintiff, although a business invitee of Gladys' Beauty 
Salon, had any express invitation of either the defendants 
Smith or the defendant Nelson to use the rear entrance of 
the building in patronizing the salon. The large exterior 
metal door with no indication or advertisement of the 
business within (Exs. 2 & 15) and the rear interior door 
bearing the sign "EMPLOYEES ONLY" (Exs. 3 & 25) 
would, in the absence of any oral invitation, preclude 
the possibility of a finding by a jury that there was any 
express invitation to plaintiff to use the rear entrance. 
And, in fact, plaintiff admits that she never received any 
express permission to use the rear entrance (T. 311, lines 
20-26): 
"QUESTION: But you hadn't asked anyone's 
permission whatsoever, to do that? That is 
correct, is it not? 
ANSWER: That's correct. I never seen anybody 
ask for permission to go out there. 
QUESTION: But you certainly hadn't done, isn't 
that correct? 
ANSWER: That's correct." 
12 
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The fact that plaintiff was an invitee of the beauty 
salon did not give her license to use the premises indis-
criminately. As stated in Bird vs. Cloverleaf Dairy, 102 
Utah 330, 125 P.2d 797 (1942): 
"We believe plaintiff's case is founded upon a 
fallacy. An invitee must use the owner's premises 
in the usual, ordinary, and customary way.9' (Em-
phasis added.) 
Although plaintiff was admittedly "invited" to use the 
front entrance to Gladys' Beauty Salon, she was no more 
than a licensee or trespasser as to the rear portion and en-
trance of the building. In Hayward vs. Downing, et al, 
112 Utah 508, 189 P.2d 442 (1948), this Court observed: 
"A person may be an invitee as to a part of the 
premises, and a mere licensee or a trespasser as to 
other parts of the premises. A common example of 
this is a store. As a general rule the public is in-
vited to enter the store for the purpose of transact-
ing business. However, this invitation ordinarily 
extends only to that part of the store where goods 
are displayed for sale and business is ordinarily 
transacted. Generally, the public is not invited to 
enter the stockrooms, furnace rooms, and other 
parts of the store, and if persons go to these parts 
of the premises they lose their status as invitees 
and become mere licensees or trespassers. 38 Am. 
Jur. 761, Negligence, Sec. 100. See also haw and v. 
California Products Co., 9 Cal. App. 2d 147, 48 
P.2d 979." (Emphasis added.) 
If plaintiff had no invitation to use the rear portion 
of the building, defendants had no duty to anticipate her 
presence there, or to make the premises reasonably safe 
for her. As stated in Bird vs. Cloverleaf Dairy, supra, a 
13 
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licensee takes the premises as he finds them and the posses-
sor of land is required only to refrain from acts of negli-
gence which may cause injury to him, and none were 
alleged or proven in the instant case. 
Plaintiff contends that on a few prior occasions she 
bad seen patrons and employees of the beauty salon use 
the rear entrance, and therefore, assumed she had implied 
permission to likewise use the rear entrance. Whether 
or not such observations created an implied invitation of 
the Smith defendants to plaintiff to use the rear entrance is 
immaterial as to the defendant Nelson, since there is no 
evidence in the record that he had ever seen or had reason 
to believe that patrons of either Gladys' or his other tenant, 
the Spice Rack, had or would use the rear entrance. In-
deed, the defendant Smith acknowledged that Mr. Nelson 
had advised him that the outside rear door was to remain 
closed and locked at all times (T. 376). 
Therefore, even if the Court should determine that 
the question of plaintiff's contributory negligence should 
have been submitted to the jury, the judgment of dismissal 
in favor of the defendant Nelson should be affirmed since 
there is no evidence in the record that the defendant Nel-
son knew of any circumstances out of which one could 
conclude that he had granted an express or implied in-
vitation for patrons of his tenants to use the rear entrance 
to the building; and, in the absence of having granted an 
express or implied invitation, he had no affirmative duty 
to make the premises safe for patrons, even assuming, 
arguendo, that they were not. 
14 
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Although the trial court based its ruling which grant-
ed defendants' motions for a directed verdict on the 
ground that plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a 
matter of law, and even if the trial court erred in so doing, 
if the judgment was proper on other grounds, as we be-
lieve it was with respect to the defendant Nelson, it should 
be affirmed in the interest of judicial economy as was 
noted by the Court in Rasmussen vs. Davis, 1 Utah 2d 96, 
262 P.2d 488 (1953): 
". . . We feel constrained therefore, to affirm, in 
the light of our accepted policy of so doing if the 
conclusion reached, though based on incorrect rea-
sons, is in fact correct for some other reason." 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly granted defendants' respec-
tive motions for a directed verdict at the conclusion of all 
the evidence since the evidence, taken in the light most 
favorable to plaintiff, which was her own testimony, was 
that when she opened the rear exterior door, the area 
inside was so well illuminated that she was unaware that 
the artificial light was not on, yet she failed to see the 
"EMPLOYEES ONLY" sign on the interior door, or the 
stairway which was adjacent thereto and less than ten 
feet away. After she closed the exterior door it was "pitch-
black," yet she attempted to walk toward a door she could 
not see. 
Further, even if the trial court erred in directing plain-
tiff's contributory negligence as a matter of law, the 
judgment of dismissal entered was still proper with re-
spect to the defendant Nelson since plaintiff introduced 
no evidence during trial from which a jury could have 
15 
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found that the defendant Nelson either expressly or im-
pliedly invited the plaintiff to use the rear portion of the 
building in question; and, in the absence of such an invita-
tion, he owed no affirmative duty to the plaintiff to make 
the premises safe for her, and he was not guilty of any 
negligent act toward her while she was on the premises. 
WHEREFORE, defendant Nelson respectfully prays 
that the trial court's judgment of dismissal as to him be 
affirmed and that he be awarded his costs herein. 
Respectfully submitted this ....^T... day of May, 1974. 
H. Wayne Wadsworth 
HANSON, WADSWORTH 
& RUSSON 
702 Kearns Building 
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